Relations between China and Turkey are quiescent. In a globalizing Asia-Pacific, however, they are unlikely to remain so. High economic interdependence in the presence of the rise of Asian and Eurasian powers suggest that China and Turkey as multiregional states have a common interest in regional cooperation. It is within this context that bilateral relations are likely to develop. China's rapid rise means that its impact will not be confined to Pacific Asia. Increasingly, with the quest for energy security, China is setting its diplomatic compass westward to Eurasia and the Middle East.
administrative culture, which was drawn from Confucian learning, in order to maintain so large an empire and retain the Mandate of Heaven (the legitimacy of the time) to rule. The Sui dynasty (581-618) that came before the Tang was founded by Yang Jian, of Sino-Turkic ancestry through his family links to the Northern Zhou ruling family. 6 The first use of "Turk" as a political name, and henceforth as a designation (Turkic) for a linguistic group, was Tujue in the sixth century. The Tujue (or Göktürk) lived in the northern part of presentday Xinjiang in Northwest China and expanded their empire across Eurasia as far as Eastern Europe and North Asia. The area, often referred to as Turkistan, was conquered by the Mongols under Genghis Khan in 1220. By 1279, the Mongols conquered China as well, ruling for 89 years as the Yuan dynasty. Today, after the expansion of Tsarist Russia and, subsequently, the Soviet Union, Turkic culture has survived in its local variations. Five Central Asian statesAzerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan -are identifiably Turkic in culture, though the region as a whole is regarded as culturally diverse. Turkic culture is also found in China's Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. This eastern part of "Turkistan" (hence the name "East Turkistan" or "Chinese Turkistan") was conquered by China's Manchu rulers, who formed the Qing dynasty , and was given the name Xinjiang -meaning "new frontier" -when incorporated into the Chinese polity.
A Comparative Profile of the Two Republics through the Prisms of Theory and Culture
Today, the modern states of China and Turkey present an intriguing couple. A conference paper for the International Studies Association on poliheuristic theory -which seeks to explain foreign policy decision-making by observing it in two stages, cognitive and rational -employs Turkey and China as case studies.
7 Why? They are seen as "two important states that frequently are characterized as sui generis" and show distinctive peculiarities. China's peculiarity is that it cannot be analyzed purely on the basis of "Western rationality, with its cost-benefit analysis" as it is 6 Capon and Forman, Tang China, p. 14. 7 Nukhet Sandal, Enyu Zhang, Carolyn C. James, and Patrick James, "Poliheuristic Theory grounded in a different philosophical system; hence "cognitive heuristics" have an important role to play in analyzing Chinese foreign policy-making. Turkey's peculiarity is that, as with China, its unique (sui generis) status means that it will "resist the predictions of models based on Western, social scientific concepts". 8 This also permits greater scope for the application of "cognitive heuristics". What is unique about Turkey? The authors of the study on poliheuristic theory have noted a number of distinctive features, including: its democratic, secular profile in a volatile region; its capacity to absorb several military coups and bounce back as a constitutionally-based democracy; its religious but generally not ethnic ties with the Middle East; its pro-Western strategic affiliation during the Cold War; and even its continuing sound relations with Israel, a situation which is deemed remarkable for a predominantly Muslim country.
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If social constructivism is introduced as the theoretical framework, the emphasis falls not on the unique but on the mutable: a nation's identity is seen as being a work-in-progress through mutual interaction and norm formation. Thus the constructions to which the theory refers are those of shared meanings obtained through social learning. As Shimko defines it, social constructivism is a "perspective that stresses the importance of identities and shared understandings in shaping the behavior of social actors". 10 Kegley and Wittkopf further elaborate by defining it as:
A liberal-realist theoretical approach advocated by Alexander Wendt that sees self-interested states as the key actors in world politics; their actions are determined not by anarchy but by the ways states socially "construct" and then respond to the meanings they give to power politics, so that as their definitions change, cooperative practices can evolve.
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Social constructivism is the preferred theory through which international relations scholars in The Way that can be spoken of is not the constant Way;
The name that can be named is not the constant name.
The nameless is the beginning of Heaven and Earth;
The named is the mother of all things.
In a comparative study of Sufism and Daoism, it was found that the two systems were in agreement on a number of points despite one deriving from Islamic philosophy and the other from
Chinese. This is a regionalism with global characteristics and through which the nation-state pursues its interests. 16 In the case of the European Union, the global region is so advanced that states pool their sovereignty and the unit of analysis is shifting from state to region. The disabling features of a regionally-enabled proximity, when an EU-level of integration is still unrealized, are often those of unresolved ethnic or boundary issues, as well as a clash of economic interests.
Clash of Economic Interests and the New Geopolitics
The region which represents the common ground of Sino-Turkish history and future opportunities is Eurasia. Encompassing the Caspian Sea basin and Central Asia, it represents one of the world's richest, largely untapped, sources of oil and natural gas. Here China and Turkey have been viewed to be in competition over resources:
The rivalry is particularly pronounced in the struggle for Caspian exports of gas and oil from the former Soviet states ringing the inland sea, whose reserves contain an estimated 32 billion to 220 Moreover, China has revamped its tax incentives to promote the higher end exports.
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China often proclaims its intention is to promote a "win-win" strategy in its economic dealings with its business partners. This also carries over to diplomacy and is intended to quell In light of this it is not surprising that Chinese strategy favors deploying the trader over the warrior, a situation which is not only correlative with its international environment but also in keeping with a strategic culture which privileges wen (civility) over wu (martiality). Wu was only to be resorted to if wen failed and was believed to be most effective when it was not dominant over implemented its "harmonious world-oriented" diplomacy which took into account "both its national interests and the interests of other countries". 25 This "win-win" strategy was met, as shown above, with a dual response from the US -encouragement to Beijing to integrate with the world responsibly but also a preparedness by the US to deal with a China that may become foe rather than friend. In this respect the role of Turkey can be a productive one. In a reversal of the old realist adage of "my enemy's enemy is my friend", Turkey could represent a constructivist motto of "my potential enemy's friend should be my engaged ally". This broadening and thickening of relationships allows for greater trust-building across the regional domain of mutual interest.
Like China, Turkey is still a developing country. Despite urban pockets of 21 st century sophistication, it must address huge domestic priorities in economic development. Moreover, concern over internal security issues (elaborated below) has taken precedence over possible aspirations for regional leadership. Ankara's post-Cold War "new activism" has been noted with attacks on its population, Ankara upholds the key foreign policy principle of territorial unity and integrity. This is not only a principle it applies to itself, but also to other nation-states, including China and Iraq. "Peace at home, peace in the world" is Ankara's policy slogan for this position.
The "One China" policy is also an expression of determination to prevent separatists from "splitting" the "motherland". Beijing has threatened military action against Taiwan if the island declares formal independence; and it maintains tight security against Tibetan and Uyghur independence movements. Its fears of attempts by these groups to draw attention to their cause during the 2008 Beijing Olympics were justified: Tibetan protests broke out during the prelude to the Olympics. The international Olympic torch relay attracted pro-Tibetan protestors worldwide.
Three attacks by Uyghur separatists resulted in the killing of more than 30 people in Xinjiang.
While the Olympic Games themselves were not disrupted, and while China was able to impress the world with the soft power equivalent of "shock and awe" at the opening ceremony, 30 it was inevitable that a high-profile event in a non-liberal country like China would be used to draw attention to dissident causes. it is in this arena that progress may be pursued in the first instance through greater diversification of trade sectors and investing into each other's markets. It could well be that other sectors are also best dealt with by expanding the horizon. This relates back to Eurasia as a constructivist cause: a region of mutually constitutive relationships.
Beyond the Great Wall
When looking at the Eurasian expanse with its Central Asian centre and emerging power periphery, one feature stands out. Snaking across its normative heartland, like the curve separating -and connecting -yin and yang, is the Great Wall. This iconic fortification was built across centuries of Chinese history to protect the northern borders against raids by Mongol, Turkic and other tribes of Central Asia. Its continued construction only ceased when China under a Manchu dynasty, the Qing, expanded its territory beyond the Great Wall into Mongolia. In other words, it took foreign influence for China to outgrow its Great Wall mentality, and then by means of absorbing the lands beyond the Wall into China. Maintaining such a vast domain required a Confucian-trained bureaucracy and a concomitant strategic culture which preferred diplomatic over military solutions to state insecurity. 39 Ultimately, therefore, China needed to "trust in virtue, not walls" 40 to succeed. While it might be argued that the People's Republic has embarked on an expansionist drive into Central Asia to assure itself of energy security, it could equally (and more plausibly) be said that the solution to China's energy and security problems (such as ethnic separatism) may be found through diplomatic cooperation. This is where region-building mechanisms come into play, particularly the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
Indeed, Beijing's attempt to limit the danger of separatist behavior among its Uyghur population has been credited with being the inspiration for the SCO. In the 21st century interdependence of states has grown sharply, security and development are becoming 
Conclusion
Flexibility and informality are the hallmark of a globalizing Asia-Pacific, as regional cooperation has tended to start with informal dialogue and then progressed to practical projects.
There is also an emphasis on process rather than results. This is in accordance with Confucian cultural dynamics. For example, in the East Asian summit, the "comfort level principle" existsprogress may be slow but process ensures it is sustainable. Another feature of China's governance diplomacy is that it prefers to see small and medium size countries taking the lead, not itself. Here a role for Turkey is clearly evident as it is not a hegemonically-driven power.
It cannot be denied that there are obstacles to the furtherance of Sino-Turkish relations within a regional framework for achieving greater interaction for security and economic growth.
These include the diversity of cultures and religions in Eurasia, as this poses a problem for identity.
On the other hand there is strength in global civilizational dialogue, as demonstrated by the historic Silk Road trading region. A second obstacle is the geographic enormity of the region and its uneven economic development. While presenting a hindrance to greater coordination it also makes it imperative for the rising powers of Asia and Eurasia -China, India, and Russia, in particular -to ensure stability far from home: their interests, like time and space, have been reconfigured by globalization. Thus strategic interests follow economic interests to unexpected places. For example, China would not have been so concerned with Russian behaviour in the Caucasus before its global interests had developed. A third obstacle concerns mutual confidence which is on occasion undermined by historical legacies or current conflict of interests. Still, regionalism through various multilateral governance regimes -especially an expanding SCO in which Turkey has shown interest in joining -is probable when considered from a multi-track, multi-speed, and multiinstitutional perspective. China and Turkey exhibit a realistic appreciation of the complexity and magnitude of maintaining good relations in their multiregional peripheries. This includes China's awareness of the need to be cautious not to be seen as manipulative of others in view of its size and influence; hence the utility of its "win-win" soft power strategy. Turkey, too, needs to maintain its unique bridging potential between its Western allies and the Middle East, and between its anticipated European future and its Central Asian history.
In the final analysis it is up to China as the new global power of the 21 st century to inspire confidence in overcoming obstacles and promoting the benefits of regional cooperation. China has participated in a range of multilateral organizations and advocates a layered regional cooperation in its governance diplomacy. If China's behavior is to help determine whether the region has an "open, transparent and mutually beneficial future" or "risk blundering into a future where competition and exclusion set the pattern", as US Defense Secretary Robert Gates said in May 2008, 62 then it is apparent that Beijing will need to continue to engage seriously with all players and organizations, including those of which it has tended to be wary or kept its distance in the past.
In this respect, relations with important NATO members like Turkey are of contemporary importance. It remains to be seen whether Beijing's proverbial "win-win" formula will fuel the anticipated benefits of greater regional integration. Critics may argue that instead of mutual benefit, China is in fact operating a "zero-sum" game. As identified by poliheuristic theory, "Western rationality" is not always optimal in analyzing the motives of countries of non-Western thought systems. Rather, the relationship with which they engage is mutually-constitutive. Correlative relationships are a feature of East Asian security thinking. This paper has shown that the philosophical underpinnings of China's and Turkey's culture allow for them to move forward towards regional-based relations molded by global flows.
